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Abstract  
The concept of Trust has been applied in many information systems such as e-commerce, social 
networks and smart grid networks. It is currently getting attention on the Internet of Things. The 
fundamental concept in Trust, is the ability of a user to evaluate its neighbour, or a recommended 
neighbour with the hope of being able to trust that user. In this paper, we propose SecTrust, 
which is a trust-based system that computes trust values as a time-based packet forwarding 
behaviour of a node in a peer-2-peer (P2P) network. It uses a trust rating iteration and rating 
scheme to select only trusted nodes for communication while isolating malicious nodes in the 
network. A penalty is also introduced in our system that penalizes the continuous misbehaviour 
of a node in the network. Simulation evaluation results show the superior performance of 
SecTrust over other trust systems in isolating malicious peers, improving information interaction 
success rates, enhancing trust formation, and promoting better reputation between trusted peer 
nodes. 
 
 
Keywords  
P2P, Trust, SecTrust, Recommendation System. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networking is a distributed architectural system, which divides tasks among 
peer nodes in a network. Peers willingly provide a part of their resources like storage, processing 
capacity or network bandwidth to other peer nodes. This is achieved with no central coordination 
from any servers or central coordination mechanisms. Typical application areas of P2P include: 
file sharing (Bit torrent and Gnutella); Peer-to-peer assisted streaming solution in multimedia 
(P2PTV and PDTP protocols); other areas include e-commerce and social media where P2P 
technology is used as a recommender system for user verification. 
 
In a P2P system, nodes depend on each other for seamless communication and transactions. 
However, this becomes a security concern when malicious peers abuse this relationship. To 
evenly distribute workload in P2P, a peer node exposes some of its internals to its neighbours, 
but attackers normally leverage on this to compromise the P2P network. Due to this compromise, 
the activities of the malicious peers lead to network problems including: the inhibition of P2P 
traffic (distributed denial-of-service), privacy and identity issues, network poisoning and the 
sharing and propagation of inauthentic files. Furthermore, due to the lack of a central 
coordination system, P2P networks are often prone to various malicious attacks like Sybil, 
Blackhole, Greyhole and Wormhole attacks. To address these attacks and maintain a consistent 
service delivery in P2P networks, the role of Trust and Recommendation Systems have become 
important. However, the challenge with most Trust and Recommendation systems in P2P 
networks, is the absence of effective trust mechanisms that could moderate peer node behaviour 
to effectively protect the network from trust related attacks like, good-mouthing, bad-mouthing 
and self-endorsement attacks. This is still an open research problem (Ali, Hong, & Kim, 2017). 
 
This paper proposes SecTrust; a trust-based system that mitigates trust related attacks and 
enhance trust reputation among nodes in a Sybil scenario. Furthermore, SecTrust scales well 
from a small P2P to a large P2P network. SecTrust is based on the concept of social trust in 
humanity and uses the computed trust values of neighbouring nodes to detect and isolate 
malicious actors in a distributed P2P network. The paper further provides a system of validating 
the trustworthiness of peer nodes in P2P networks hence, mitigating the influence of malicious 
attacks in a P2P network. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
introduces the concept of trust in P2P networks, and reviews some of the notable trust and 
recommendation systems used in peer-to-peer networks. Section 3 intrces SecTrust and describes 
its operational framework and key design considerations for a 2P platform. Section 4 presents the 
simulation studies to evaluate the performance of SecTrust and compares the proposed trust 
model against EigenTrust. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Work  
Trust is a social concept used among humans and it shows the level of confidence, reliability, 
assurance or even faith one party has towards another. The trust value of a peer (node) is 
calculated and evaluated based on the assurance or confidence a node has towards its 
neighbour(s) while the reputation is a function of the feedback from recommendations from its 
neighbour after due authentication and evaluation of the recommendation process (J. P. Wang, 
Bin, Yu, & Niu, 2013). A notable aspect of a trust and recommendation system is the evaluation 
of both the service requesting peers and the service provider peers, and this is necessary to 
ensure the trustworthiness of both parties and by extension the whole system. The formation of 
trust among peers in a distributed P2P system could help filter out malicious peers in a network. 
Trust in P2P networks plays a vital role in the development of a stable reputation management, 
and it facilitates the management and maintenance of such a network, especially when the 
number of nodes grows on a massive scale. Trust as a mechanism for securing P2P networks is 
an active area of research, and it remains a very important and challenging area for further 
studies (Valdez, Ziefle, Verbert, Felfernig, & Holzinger, 2016). 
 
2.1 Trust Management and Recommendation Models 
 
2.2.1 EigenTrust 
EigenTrust (Kamvar, Schlosser, & Garcia-Molina, 2003) is a renowned Trust and 
Recommendation system, which is implemented in Gnutella, a file-sharing site with millions of 
users (Chang, 2017). It utilizes local normalization together with global convergence by means 
of a vector multiplication matrix. It is based on past interactions, where past interactions could be 
viewed as a square matrix or an n×n matrix with n defined as the number of peers in the network. 
In computing the trust between two parties, the number of positive (pos) and negative (neg) 
communications is stored in what is referred to as relations. The EigenTrust model assigns more 
trust weight to some parties in the network, which are presumed pre-trusted nodes. EigenTrust 
makes available the global recommendation scores to file requesters when file owners are 
chosen. Through its trust computation system, EigenTrust is able to detect and isolate malicious 
peer nodes. 
 
Studies have shown EigenTrust to be weak in isolating masquerading malicious peers 
perpetrating themselves as trusted peers (Girdhar, Kumar, & Singh, 2013). This promotes the 
download of spurious files and an imprecise peer trustworthy assessment. In EigenTrust, a peer 
node seeking a specific file could continuously download files until it finds the precise file. This 
process amounts to excessive bandwidth usage, application efficiency decline, and creates a 
platform for the transmission of downloaded spurious files to other unsuspecting peer nodes in 
the network. Table 1 provides a summary of various trust management models, metrics 
employed, and the attacks addressed. From Table 1 and discussions above, it can be noted that 
research work on trust management and recommendation have mostly focused on successful and 
unsuccessful node transactions, feedback and historical observation of nodes in P2P networks. 
Clearly, the modelling of trust in P2P networks from a communication perspective still requires 
more research, and that is the focus of this work. For further reading, a survey of some notable 
trust and recommendation systems have been presented in (Agrawal & Mishra, 2012; Rashed, 
Ullah, & Yasmin, 2013) and it will be beneficial for additional reading. 
 
3. SecTrust  
Secure Trust (SecTrust) is a peer-to-peer lightweight trust-based system, which identifies and 
isolates malicious attacks in P2P networks. It essentially computes and evaluates the trustworthy 
behaviour of a peer node. A node’s trustworthiness in SecTrust is based upon the evaluation 
from its neighbouring nodes while providing service (recommendations and indirect trust values) 
to other nodes. This trustworthiness reflects the level of reliability or dependability (trust) that a 
peer node in the network has on another node. The trustworthiness of a node is evaluated as a 
time-based successful packet exchange between neighbour nodes, and the positive packet 
acknowledgements with a continuous trust observation of connected neighbour nodes. 
 Trust model Metrics employed Attacks addressed 
 CATrust: Context-Aware Trust • Profit-awareness Bad-mouthing, Ballot stuffing, 
 Management for Service- • Capability-limitation On-off attack, bad-mouthing 
 Oriented Ad Hoc Networks (Y. • Energy-sensitivity attack, Conflicting behavior 
 Wang et al., 2017)   attacks and Random attacks 
 Dynamic and flexible selection • Node behavioural information A model proposed for 
 of a reputation mechanism for • Node scoring and Ranking entities adaptation into other systems 
 heterogeneous environments • Node transaction levels with other selected to build trust in systems. 
 (Dólera Tormo, Gómez  entity  
 Mármol, & Martínez Pérez) • Reward/Penalty on nodes  
 Trust Management for SOA- • Direct user satisfaction experiences Trust related attacks 
 Based IoT and Its Application • Recommendations from peer nodes including: Ballot stuffing, bad- 
 to Service Composition (Chen,   mouthing, self-promoting and 
 Guo, & Bao, 2016)   opportunistic service attacks. 
 A trust model based on fuzzy • Historical behaviour Node selfish behaviour and 
 recommendation for mobile • Recent node behaviour better network performance 
 ad-hoc networks (Luo, Liu, & • Node recommendation  
 Fan, 2009) • Transitivity relationship  
  • Node consensus opinion  
 GeTrust: A Guarantee-based • Direct trust (Service direct trust and Guarantee Malicious services and 
 Trust Model in Chord-based  direct trust) feedbacks; 
 P2P networks (Meng & Liu, • Historical transaction Collusion and whitewashing 
 2016) • Credibility factor of recommended node attacks 
   provided by a guarantee peer.  
  • Node ranking based on Chord-network  
   mechanism  
 PeerTrust: Supporting • The feedback from neighbour nodes Bad mouthing attack, good 
 Reputation-Based Trust • The total number of transactions a node has mouthing attack and 
 for Peer-to-Peer Electronic  with other peers man-in-the-middle attack 
 Communities (Li & Ling, 2004) • The credibility factor source of feedback  
   received  
  • Transaction context factor for discerning critical  
   transactions from noncritical ones  
  • The community context factor (community  
   related features and susceptibilities)  
 Hierarchical Trust Social trust: Good-mouthing and bad- 
 Management for Wireless • Intimacy (for measuring closeness based on mouthing attacks 
 Sensor Networks and its  interaction experiences between nodes)  
 Applications to Trust-Based • Honesty (for measuring regularity/anomaly)  
 Routing and Intrusion  QoS trust:  
 Detection (Bao, Chen, Chang, • Energy (for measuring competence) and  
 & Cho, 2012) • Unselfishness (for measuring cooperativeness)  
 
Table 1: A summary of trust and recommendation systems with metrics used and attacks 
addressed 
 
In this system, every node computes the trustworthiness of its direct neighbours based on the 
computed direct trust value (the packet forwarding behaviour of a node towards its neighbour(s)) 
and the recommended trust value. Neighbours with higher trust values are chosen for 
communication while nodes with lower trust values are categorised as either malicious, 
compromised, or even selfish nodes that seek to preserve their resources, such as battery power. 
The proposed SecTrust system comprises of five major processes: trust calculation process, trust 
monitoring process, process to detect and isolate malicious nodes, trust rating process, and trust 
backup/recuperation process. 
 
The preliminary concept of SecTrust was introduced by us in (Airehrour, Gutierrez, & Ray, 
2016), but no comparison was made with other global trust and recommendation systems. Our 
motivation for providing a P2P trust system for reputation management as proposed in our first 
paper (Airehrour et al., 2016), is based on the fact that malicious devices could perpetrate 
“prejudiced” attacks to either destroy the reputation of unsuspecting peer devices like IoT 
sensors that provide seamless network communication or provide some essential services in the 
network. In addition, in applying our trust-based system to distributed IoT networks, which 
comprise of large number of sensors and devices working together to provide a variety of 
services, there is the risk that some will typically be malicious in their activities. Thus, a 
reputation management platform that scales across a large sized-network will prove invaluable to 
mitigating the attacks. Although our initial paper (Airehrour et al., 2016) focused on a secure 
communication in IoT routing, this proposed study however, is a refinement of that work with a 
focus on reputation management in P2P networks. This is because this proposed trust-based 
system, is designed as a conceptual trust system for reputation management in P2P 
communication thus, finding relevance and application in P2P networks. Furthermore, a 
comparison is made with a similar P2P trust algorithm (the EigenTrust). 
 
3.1 Quantifying Trust in SecTrust  
Many trust properties have been employed for trust evaluation in Wireless Sensor Networks 
(Bao & Chen, 2012; Bao et al., 2012; Gu, Wang, & Sun, 2014; J. P. Wang et al., 2013; Wu et 
al., 2014). However, for this research paper key metrics have been formulated which are used for 
the computation, evaluation and trust formation among peer nodes. The key metrics for the 
formation and computation of trust in SecTrust include: 
 
i. The positive interaction between nodes in order to determine a node’s packet forwarding 
behaviour towards its neighbours. This is determined by a node forwarding the assigned packet 
to its destination or to the next trusted hop.  
ii. Recommended trust of a node to another node as the product of the indexed trust values 
among the nodes.  
iii. The evaluation time of a node’s trustworthiness. 
iv. A penalty weight attached to any misbehaving node in the network. 
 
SecTrust uses the concept of a threshold-based trust broadcast (Dai & Gong, 2010). According to 
this concept, trustworthy nodes can be broadcast throughout the network by i) maintaining 
effective communication only among trusted nodes and, ii) ensuring the transmission of only 
trustworthy information to neighbour nodes in the network based on the trust threshold. SecTrust 
ensures this by validating the trustworthy nature of every forwarding node in the network and by 
securing the source of route information transmitted. Furthermore, we provide a method to rank 
the best trust information to optimize the performance of reputation-based communication 
among peer nodes. The SecTrust system observes various trust properties while assigning 
different weights to them. It is particularly important to assign more weight to how a node is 
currently evaluated rather than its history or past observable behaviour. This is needed to identify 
and isolate malicious nodes that may seek to build a good reputation over time and then later 
begin to perpetrate their malicious activities. Thus, the SecTrust system demonstrates that trust 
converges to the extremes (i.e. highly trusted nodes tend to maintain high trust values while 
malicious nodes quickly drift to low trust values). In addition, a repository of nodes with high 
trust values are formed. Finally, based on the penalty introduced for misbehaving nodes, the trust 
value between any two adjoining nodes that do not optimally trust each other tends to zero. A 
detailed description of the SecTrust processes and its components are presented next. 
3.2 SecTrust Process  
SecTrust is a composition of five systemic processes that operate in unison to provide trust and 
reputation management system for P2P nodes. A description of the inner workings of each 
process is discussed. 
 
3.2.1 Trust Calculation Process 
In the design of SecTrust, a trustor node evaluates a trustee node. It uses the trust value derived 
to judge if the trustee node is sufficiently reliable to fulfill an assigned mission as assessed by the 
five-tuple trust level band specified in Table 2. More specifically, the trust computation 
represents reliability, dependability, competence, and successful positive interactions or positive 
recommendations on performance of tasks sent by nodes from direct or indirect interactions with 
other nodes. Direct and recommended trust relationships could exist between two or more nodes. 
Each node gathers the direct trust values of directly linked neighbour nodes and the 
recommended trust values of neighbours that are one or more hops away. Here, we describe 
these two types of trusts. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between direct and recommended 
trusts. In direct trust, node i computes the trust value of node j since it has a direct relationship 
with node j. Thus, when there is a positive direct interaction between node i and node j, trust is 
established, and a value is computed (i.e., node j successfully forwards packets sent by node i to 
either the destination or the next trusted hop node (m)). This relationship is expressed in 
Equation 1 below. In order to ensure nodes, behave as expected, a penalty (β) is introduced to 
penalize any misbehaving node. β is a constant, which defines the penalty weight applied to any 
misbehaving node.  
 
(1) 
 
 
In the context of Figure 1, the Recommended trust between nodes i and m is described as which 
is the product of the direct trust values between nodes i,j and nodes j,m as  
shown in Equation 2 below. This scheme is also used for nodes 2-hops and beyond. 
 
 
(2)  
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Figure 1: Relationship between Direct and Recommended trusts 
3.2.2 Trust rating Process 
SecTrust employs the concept of a threshold-based trust rating system. In this concept, only 
nodes with high trust values will be considered for communication decisions. After the trust 
values have been determined, a trust rating system is further adopted to rank the highest to the 
lowest trust values obtained during the trust calculation process. This helps in not only utilising 
highly rated (trusted) nodes for communication such as routing, but also in detecting and 
isolating misbehaving nodes, which seek to adjust their trust values maliciously. 
 
To estimate the trust values, we developed a five-tuple trust level system and deduce its trust 
degree by using threshold boundary judgment. A five-tuple trust level is assigned to each node, 
and it is defined as: V = [v1, v2, v3, v4, v5]. This is expressive of the various trust levels as: [“no 
trust”,”poor trust”,“fair trust”,”good trust”,“complete trust”], respectively, and is represented 
in Table 2. 
 
Five tuple (V) Trust level Range of positive relations (%) 
v1 No trust ≥ 0 and ≤ 25 
v2 Poor trust ≥ 26 and ≤ 50 
v3 Fair trust ≥ 51 and ≤ 75 
v4 Good trust ≥ 76 and ≤ 90 
v5 Complete trust ≥ 91 and ≤ 100 
 
Table 2: A Five-Tuple Trust Level Band 
 
SecTrust considers nodes in the v5 tuple as perfect nodes for trustworthy communication while 
nodes in the v4 tuple, although good, could possibly have some mixed-element behaviours. 
SecTrust does not rely on nodes in the v3, v2, and v1 tuples, but to maintain stable 
communications, it uses nodes in the order of v3 and v2, if nodes in the v5 and v4 categories are 
unavailable. 
 
3.2.3 Process to Detect and Isolate Malicious Nodes 
The most important task of any secure information system is to guarantee the confidentiality, 
integrity, availability and authenticity of the information transmitted. This issue becomes 
challenging in some P2P networks, because (i) the peer nodes are resource-constrained, (ii) the 
number of connected peer devices are numerous, and (iii) some P2P networks have lossy 
wireless transmission links. The work done in this research focuses on the detection and isolation 
of insider attacks that are rather more difficult to detect. This is because the malicious nodes 
form part of the network and are privy to every detail of the network process. This study uses 
node overhearing and monitoring methods to determine anomalous traffic routes towards a node 
as the possible indication of a rank attack or a colluding attack. Furthermore, SecTrust, being a 
trust-based system, can be prone to trust related attacks like Good-mouthing (endorsing a 
misbehaving node) and Bad-mouthing attacks (maligning a good node). To address this, 
SecTrust has an internal mechanism to defend against the above mentioned attacks in the 
following three ways:  
• By allocating a higher weightage (80%) to the current trust value of the recommender node 
rather than the recommended node; 
 
• If the current trust value of the recommender node falls short of the trust threshold value 
required, then both the recommending and the recommended nodes are discarded, and 
alternative nodes are sought. 
• However, if the recommender node’s trust value is above the trust threshold then the 
computed trust value of the recommending node is multiplied with the computed direct 
trust value of the recommended node to get the final weighted computed trust value of the 
recommended node. 
 
3.2.4 Trust Monitoring Update Process 
This process is an observation and update phase where every node gathers the trust information 
of their immediate and distant neighbours based on (a) direct relationships and (b) the 
recommendations between the nodes. SecTrust also updates the trust values of nodes and in 
doing that it employs any of the two methods namely; the periodic trust update and the reactive 
trust update.  
• The periodic trust update is based on a given set time when trust values are re-computed 
for updates.  
• The reactive trust update is intended for the spatially connected and distributed nodes 
that trigger network communication updates (e.g., route updates) and are hence, reactive 
based on their sparse communication links. 
 
4. Trust Framework and Performance Evaluation  
In a peer-to-peer network, an evaluating peer (trustor) evaluates another peer’s (trustee) 
trustworthy level to decide on its reliability to perform certain expected tasks. Nodes in trust 
models aim to locate a reliable party that will cooperate with them to perform specific tasks. In 
this Section, we assess the general behaviour and performance efficiency of SecTrust against 
EigenTrust (Kamvar et al., 2003). We have used the Quantitative Trust Management (QTM) P2P 
trust simulator (West, Kannan, Lee, & Sokolsky, 2010) to evaluate the proposed SecTrust system 
while Table 3 lists the simulation parameters. 
 
We have selected the EigenTrust model to compare against SecTrust due to the following reason: 
EigenTrust is based on a P2P network design and is efficient, lightweight, scalable and 
deployable as an embedded system. Furthermore, EigenTrust as a global reputation management 
system, has been implemented in file sharing networks like Gnutella. Although various 
improvements to EigenTrust have been put forward by researchers, we are unaware however, of 
any that has been adopted as a replacement to EigenTrust. Therefore, verifying the efficacy of 
SecTrust against EigenTrust in this study is appropriate and it provides a meaningful 
comparison. Furthermore, even though security covers confidentiality, integrity and availability, 
this study addresses availability by isolating malicious nodes that undermine the network and 
inhibit the availability of resources among nodes. Hence, the comparison in this study is based 
on the trust effectiveness between SecTrust and EigenTrust. Thus, a higher trust effectiveness 
between nodes depicts better reputation among nodes and hence, better availability of resources 
and communication between nodes hence, improved network performance. 
 
4.1 Embedding SecTrust into the QTM P2P Trace Simulator  
The P2P-trace simulator has pre-developed Application Programming Interfaces (API’s) that 
makes the inclusion of new trust and recommendation systems easy. The trace simulator 
comprises of four main modules namely: the CORE_LIB, the GENERATOR_LIB, the 
SIMULATOR_LIB and the TRUST_SYSTEM_LIB. SecTrust is developed in Java and included 
in the TRUST_SYSTEM_LIB of the simulator. 
Parameters Value 
Number of Users and 
50 users with 10,000 transactions 
100 users with 10,000 transactions 
Number of Transactions 500 users with 100,000 transactions 
 1,000 users with 100,000 transactions 
Number of Files 5,000 
Max. User Connections 2 
Bandwidth Period 1 
β 0.005 
Zipf Constant 0.4 
Pre-Trusted Users 5 
Good Behaving Users 40 
Purely Malicious Users 10 
 
Table 3: Trust Simulation Parameter Settings 
 
The QTM simulator provides some key metrics that are used as indices in determining the 
effectiveness of the different trust and recommendation systems. According to the framework in 
(West et al., 2010), the effectiveness of a trust and recommendation system is given as the ratio 
of the number of valid transactional files received by users (nodes) to the number of transactions 
attempted by good users (despite the malicious operations of bad users in the network). Equation 
3 denotes this.  
 
(3)  
 
4.2 Simulation Setup and Scenarios  
The simulation study demonstrates the behavioural reactions of the various trust and 
recommendation systems. Further, it presents the different aspects of malicious users (nodes) 
simulated under two malicious scenario types: i) the purely naïve scenario (a scenario in which, 
malicious nodes do not collaborate with each other, but rather maliciously operate by 
themselves), and ii) the purely collective scenario (scenario whereby malicious nodes collaborate 
among themselves to perpetrate attacks). While the former uses the global interaction data of 
user nodes as the basis for the computation of trust values (and hence, no other implicit data is 
considered or used for trust evaluation), the later simulates a scenario where malicious peers 
share honest information amongst themselves. 
 
4.3 Simulations Results  
A summary of simulation results is presented under the purely naïve and purely collective 
scenarios. 
4.3.1 Effectiveness Metric for 50-Nodes 
Figure 2 presents a comparison of the effectiveness metric of EigenTrust and SecTrust systems 
in a 50 P2P node network, for the purely naïve and purely collective scenarios. Under the purely 
naïve scenario, SecTrust had a better trust effectiveness metric of 0.9028 in 0.32 seconds 
compared to EigenTrust (0.9016). However, EigenTrust had a slightly lower completion time 
(0.31 seconds) over SecTrust (0.32 seconds). Under the purely collective scenario, SecTrust had 
the best trust effectiveness (0.9008) in 1.29 seconds, while EigenTrust had 0.8983 in 1.33 
seconds. 
4.3.2 Effectiveness Metric for 100-Nodes 
Like the effectiveness metric for 50 nodes, Figure 3 shows the simulation results of the purely 
naïve and collective effectiveness metrics of the trust algorithms for a 100-node network. For the 
purely naively scenario, SecTrust showed better effectiveness (0.9439) and completion time 
(1.04 seconds). In addition, under the purely collective scenario, SecTrust still had better trust 
effectiveness performance (0.9426) over EigenTrust (0.9358).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Trust model effectiveness of a 
50-node network in purely naïve and purely 
collective scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Trust model effectiveness of 
a 100-node network in purely naïve and 
purely collective scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Trust model effectiveness of a 
500-node network in purely naïve and purely 
collective scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Trust model effectiveness of 
a 1000-node network in purely naïve 
and purely collective scenarios. 
 
4.3.3 Effectiveness Metric for 500-Nodes 
Figure 4 presents the simulation results of the purely naïve and purely collective effectiveness 
metric of the trust algorithms for a 500-node network. In the purely naïve scenario, SecTrust 
gives a superior performance with respect to both the effectiveness metric (0.9506) and 
completion time (4.65 minutes). Under the purely collective scenario, SecTrust equally gives 
better effectiveness metric performance (0.9427) with a completion time of 2.46 hours. 
 
4.3.4 Effectiveness Metric for 1000-Nodes 
Under the purely naïve scenario in the 1,000–node setting (Figure 5), SecTrust with a 0.9585 
effectiveness value and a completion time of 23.59 minutes, showed better performance over 
EigenTrust. The EigenTrust effectiveness metric of 0.9277 indicates that with the growth in 
network size, its effectiveness metric starts to decline. The difference in the effectiveness metric 
recorded between SecTrust and EigenTrust under the purely naïve scenario shows a 3.32% 
performance increase for SecTrust over EigenTrust. The result of the purely collective scenario 
is shown in Figure 5. SecTrust showed better trust effectiveness (0.9550) over EigenTrust, which 
recorded 0.9466.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Effectiveness of Trust models against 
Sybil attacks under purely naive setting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Trust effectiveness against Sybil 
attacks under purely collective setting. 
 
4.3.5 Trust Effectiveness against Sybil Attacks Under a Naïve Scenario 
Figure 6 shows the relative performances of EigenTrust and SecTrust under the Sybil naïve 
scenario. Again, SecTrust maintained better trust effectiveness, consistent performance and 
scalability over EigenTrust across the 50, 100, 500 and 1000 nodes during the simulation. 
 
4.3.6 Trust Effectiveness against Sybil Attacks Under a Collective Scenario 
Under the Sybil collective scenario, Figure 7 provides the effectiveness metric of EigenTrust and 
SecTrust. Again, SecTrust showed better consistent performance and scalability over EigenTrust 
and EigenTrust Incremental across the 50 to 1000 nodes during the simulation. 
 
5. Conclusions  
This paper proposes SecTrust, a trust-based system for P2P networks based on the quality of the 
packet forwarding behaviour of peer nodes. Using the framework described in (West et. al., 
2010), the trust-based effectiveness and performance testing of SecTrust against EigenTrust were 
compared. Simulation results under both scenarios (the purely naïve, and purely collective) 
shows that performance wise, SecTrust proved to be superior to EigenTrust. Based on the 
simulation findings we conclude that SecTrust has shown promising effectiveness and efficiency 
in trust management even in the presence of adversaries as presented in this paper. In our future 
work, we hope to present threat models to demonstrate the robustness of SecTrust against attacks 
in comparison to other trust and recommendation systems. 
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